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*The Persistent Problems of Philosophy.* An Introduction to Metaphysics through a Study of Modern Systems. By MARY WHITON CALKINS. Third Revised Edition. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1912.—pp. xxvi, 577.

This book, first published in 1907, has now reached its third edition. "The present revision of the book," Miss Calkins tells us, "has been undertaken primarily in order to relate its conclusions to the more recent of contemporary philosophical writings, and, in particular, to refer to the arguments against idealism so loudly urged by those who call themselves 'neo-realists.' Advantage has also been taken of the opportunity to amend and to supplement many passages of the book." The preface gives a detailed list of the additions and changes in this edition. It also calls attention to two points of terminology: (1) "to the useful, and neglected, distinction between 'qualitatively' and 'numerically' pluralistic or monistic systems, and (2) to the use, throughout the book, of the term 'idealism,' in the widest possible sense to mean 'the conception of reality as of the nature of consciousness.'"

With regard to this last point, there can be doubt that the protest against the limitation of 'idealism' to subjectivism is amply justified. Against the latter theory the neo-realists have claimed an easy victory; yet their victory has been barren because their logic has not allowed them to advance a step beyond the position which they criticize. But it seems to me doubtful whether Miss Calkins is justified in holding that her own use of the term 'idealism,' to mean that the universe is 'personal' or 'of the nature of consciousness,' is "the widest possible." I should be inclined to use the term 'idealism' for any philosophy that holds to the continuity and inner relationship of all of the various parts of reality. Anything is 'ideal' in which the nature of a whole is bound up, and which therefore cannot be defined by itself but only in terms of its 'representative' value and functions. Whether this category leads on necessarily to the conclusion that the universe is 'personal' is a question on which individual idealists disagree; the category of an Absolute person, or an Absolute experience is not necessarily, it seems to me, the only form under which an objective idealism can be maintained.

The *Persistent Problems* is a book which has gained a permanent place for itself in philosophical literature. Whether one approves the classifications of philosophical systems in the formalistic manner of this work, one is compelled to admire the clear and scholarly character of its presentation of problems and systems, and the courage with which it maintains the importance of the great issues of modern thought. It is assumed throughout that philosophy is not something that needs to be rendered 'interesting' by any external devices, but that it is a serious business demanding our best scholarship and most persistent thought. This is a book written for students, but a book which assumes that students of today still possess the intelligence and interests of their predecessors. The appendix and notes contain much valuable information, partly bibliographical, partly in the form of exposition,

that will be found valuable for everyone concerned with the history of the modern period of philosophy.

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- I. *Eine Serienmethode für Reaktionsversuche.* NARZISS ACH. Untersuchungen z. Psych. und Phil., I, 5, pp. 1-44.
- II. *Bemerkungen zur Untersuchung des Willens.* NARZISS ACH. Unters. z. Psych. u. Phil., I, 5, pp. 47-49.
- III. *Fortlaufende Arbeit und Willensbetätigung.* DR. ANDREAS HILLGRUBER. Unters. z. Psych. u. Phil., I, 6, pp. 1-50.
- IV. *Über Willenshemmung und Willensbahnung.* DR. GUSTAV GLÄSSNER. Unters. z. Psych. u. Phil., I, 7, pp. 1-143.

I. This article is a very minute description with many diagrams of an elaborate set of apparatus used for presenting without interruption in small, variable time-intervals a series of visual stimuli, and for accurately recording both the contents and the time of speech-reactions. For this purpose the author employs a combination of phonograph and dictaphone. He presents several pages of Tables showing the calculation of various mechanical factors of operation and their constant errors. In a final paragraph he discusses the theoretical significance of such an elaborate method for psychological purposes and points out that while in the early stages of psychological experimentation the question of technique was overemphasized and the importance of the instruction to the observer was neglected, in the present stage there is a strong tendency for the opposite error, which his method tries to counteract by combining delicacy of apparatus with due consideration of the nature of the instruction (Aufgabe) and of course minute introspection.

II. This is a short reply to some criticisms of Ach's book *Über den Willensakt und das Temperament*, by O. Selz, in which Ach points out that he does not hold, as assumed by Selz, that any short or abbreviated act of will must contain all the factors which a complete or most energetic expression of will reveals. Other objections are refuted in Glässner's work (cf. IV).

III. The problem of this investigation was the study of the relation of voluntary effort to continuous mental work. The general method was to present a senseless combination of consonants and vowels of the type "tudad," which the observer first had to read aloud and then to modify aloud by interchanging the first and last consonants, thus reading "pudat." This was continued with many stimuli for ten minutes, once at a slow rate, once moderately fast, and once at a fast speed. The original reading and the identity of the three middle letters favor the perseverative tendency to repeat merely, which had to be overcome by an act of will or strong concentration of attention. The faster speeds increased the obstacle. The apparatus used was the one described by Ach in a previous article (cf. I). Four observers completed three series, one of each speed, on each of six successive days. The time of reading and of the reversed re-reading was measured and a record of errors in both was kept.